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Testimony of Louis Michael Seidman
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center
Hearing: An Examination of the Constitutional Amendment on Marriage
October 20, 2005
U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Property Rights

Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for affording me the opportunity to testify concerning the so-called Marriage
Protection Amendment. As you know better than I, the moral, ethical, and public policy
questions posed by the Amendment generate strong emotions on all sides. Like most
Americans, I have views about these questions, but I do not pretend to any special
expertise about them. Therefore, I will confine my testimony to a subject I do know
something about – the way in which courts are likely to interpret the amendment and its
likely effect on the institution of marriage.

With regard to these matters, I am sorry to say that the amendment reflects remarkably
poor lawyering. If adopted, the amendment will grant unelected federal judges
untrammeled discretion that could be checked by neither Congress nor state legislatures
regarding domestic relations law. Despite its title, the amendment would also have the
perverse effect of weakening the institution of marriage. Because I cannot believe that the
drafters of the amendment intended these results, I strongly urge you to reject the
amendment being considered in this hearing and other similar amendments pending in
this congress.

The amendment under consideration reads as follows:

Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.'

This proposed amendment creates a number of interpretive ambiguities. First, federal
courts will be required to decide what the word "marriage" means. They will then have to
decide what "the legal incidents thereof" means and what "construed" means. It is
important to emphasize that the answers to these questions would become matters of
federal constitutional law that would not be revisable by either the Congress or the
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individual states.

Why do these words pose interpretive problems? Suppose we start by focusing on the
word "marriage" in the first sentence of the proposed amendment. Clearly, the framers of
the amendment meant to distinguish between "marriage" itself and its "legal incidents."
This much is obvious because the first sentence defines only "marriage," while the
second sentence refers to both "marriage" and its "legal incidents." This distinction is
puzzling to say the least. Marriage is a legal institution. At least in the civil realm, the
only thing that it consists of is a collection of "legal incidents." Apparently, the framers
have in mind a distinction between core legal attributes, which make up "marriage," and
an unspecified list of peripheral attributes, which make up its "legal incidents." Because
the amendment is entirely silent about what is core and what is periphery, it gives federal
judges unchecked power to place various aspects of marriage in one category or the
other. Short of another constitutional amendment, neither the states nor Congress could
do anything to reverse these decisions.

Some hypothetical situations illustrate the problems that this ambiguity is certain to
cause. First, suppose that a state passed a statute that unambiguously created "civil
unions" under which gay couples could enjoy most, but not quite all, of the benefits and
burdens of marriage. Is this a "marriage," or does it confer only the "legal incidents" of
marriage? The answer is important because if it is a "marriage," then the statute is
unconstitutional under the first sentence of the amendment, whereas if it involves only
the "legal incidents" of marriage, then it might well be constitutionally permissible under
the second sentence.

As members of this Subcommittee know, this hypothetical is hardly far-fetched. A
number of states have created, or are considering creating, various forms of civil union.
Yet even the drafters of the amendment are apparently unsure about its effect on these
statutes. Consider, for example, Professor Gerard Bradley's testimony before this
Subcommittee last April. Professor Bradley, a proponent of the amendment who
participated in its drafting, testified as follows:
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[The amendment] leaves it wide open for legislatures to extend some, many, most,
perhaps all but one, I suppose, benefit of marriage to unmarried people, but I would say .
. . if it is marriage in all but name, that is ruled out by the definition of marriage in the
first sentence

How can a judge possibly determine whether or not a civil union that includes all but a
relatively minor benefit of marriage is a "marriage in all but name" when even drafters of
amendment are uncertain as to its meaning? Reasonable people might differ about
whether civil unions are wise. It is simply irresponsible, however, to turn that question
over to federal judges for them to decide for all time and for the entire country without
any guidance from elected officials.

A similar problem is posed by the second sentence of the amendment, which provides
that constitutions shall not be "construed" to require that either marriage—whatever the
courts decide that is—or "the legal incidents thereof"—whatever they are—be conferred
on anyone other than a different-sex couple. Suppose that a state court interprets a
vaguely worded statute or constitutional provision to allow grandparents visitation rights.
Again, this hypothetical is hardly far fetched. State courts throughout the country are
considering this very question, and some courts have afforded grandparents these rights.
But if visitation is an incident of marriage, and if this amendment is enacted, then the
granting of these rights violates the federal Constitution. This is so because grandparents
are not part of "the union of a man and woman," and are therefore not entitled to enjoy
the incidents of marriage. Do the members of this subcommittee really intend this result?
Do they really wish to give federal judges the discretion to impose this outcome or not as
they choose?

The word "construed" is also ambiguous, and its vagueness is certain to cause more
mischief. The most sensible reading of the amendment is that gay men and lesbians
should not enjoy core marriage rights (whatever they are), but that states can create
peripheral "incidents of marriage" for them, so long as no construal of a constitution is
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necessary to create them. Even apart from the ambiguity of the word "construed," this
provision creates truly bizarre results. Suppose that a state constitution contains an equal
protection clause and a state court "construes" the clause to guarantee some of the
incidents of marriage to gay men and lesbians. Apparently, this action would violate the
amendment and is therefore void. Now suppose that a federal court so ruled and that, in
response, the state legislature enacted an ordinary statute containing an identically
worded equal protection provision. If a state court "construes" the state statute to provide
incidents of marriage to gay men and lesbians, its actions are perfectly permissible. This
is so because the Marriage Protection Amendment refers only to constitutions. Do the
drafters really mean to accord less respect to state constitutions than to state statutes? So
far as I am aware, this distinction is entirely unprecedented in this history of American
jurisprudence and serves no function that I can imagine.

The second sentence of the amendment would also require federal judges to develop a
jurisprudence that distinguished between the "construal" of a state constitutional
provision and its mere "enforcement." Apparently, if the state provision explicitly and
unambiguously granted incidents of marriage to gay men and lesbians, it would be
permissible because no "construction" of it would be necessary. On the other hand, if the
state provision is open textured and a court would be required to "construe" it, the court
could not do so in a fashion that would extend the incidents of marriage to gay men and
lesbians. The problem, of course, is that most cases will fall somewhere in the middle.
Courts regularly consider constitutional provisions the meaning of which is not perfectly
clear. Perhaps, for example, the wording is somewhat vague, but its legislative history
leaves no doubt about the intent of the framers. How is a federal court to decide whether
a state court's engagement with a particular provision constitutes a forbidden "construal"
or mere enforcement? In order to make this determination, the word "construe" will,
itself, have to be construed. Federal courts performing this task will be required to decide
for state courts how state judges should go about interpreting their own constitutions. One
wonders, yet again, whether the framers of this amendment really intend this result.

Perhaps the drafters of the amendment believe that this unprecedented transfer of power
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to the federal judiciary is necessary to save the institution of marriage. The final irony,
however, is that the amendment actually weakens that institution. This is true in two
respects. First, the amendment has the remarkable, and no doubt unintended, effect of
abolishing marriage in the State of Massachusetts. As I am sure members of this
subcommittee know, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health that the state's guarantee of equal protection required that
gays and straights be treated equally with regard to access to marriage. It is important to
understand that nothing in the proposed amendment reverses or modifies that decision.
True, the amendment makes marriage unavailable for gay men and lesbians. The holding
of the Massachusetts court, however, was that gays and straights must be treated equally.
The Massachusetts constitution has not been amended since that holding was rendered,
and nothing in the proposed federal amendment supercedes it. Hence, even after the
amendment is adopted, Massachusetts courts will be under a continuing duty to provide
this equal treatment. Equality can be created in one of two different ways: by granting the
benefit to the disadvantaged group, or by withholding it from the advantaged group. In
Goodridge, the Massachusetts court sensibly choose the first course. If adopted the
proposed amendment would deprive the court of that option. If the Massachusetts court
remains true to its reading of Massachusetts law, it would therefore have no choice but to
choose the second course. The upshot would be civil unions for all citizens of
Massachusetts and the abolition of marriage. I must ask again: Do members of this
subcommittee really intend this result?

The amendment also undermines marriage in a second respect. It does nothing to change
the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, which invalidated sodomy statutes as
applied to gay men and lesbians. Strikingly, that decision creates a constitutional right to
engage in even casual sex with total strangers. When Lawrence is read together with this
amendment, the upshot is a fundamental constitutional right to casual sex, but an absolute
constitutional prohibition on long-term, committed gay relationships. The amendment, in
effect, constitutionalizes the one night stand. Is this a sensible way to protect the
institution of marriage?
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Some years ago, I had the honor of serving as the Reporter for a bipartisan blue ribbon
committee convened by The Constitution Project, under the chairmanship of two
distinguished former members of Congress – the Honorable Abner Mikva and the
Honorable Mickey Edwards. Our assigned task was to develop guidelines for the
amendment of the Constitution. We did so in a document entitled "'Great and
Extraordinary Occasions:' Developing Guidelines for Constitutional Change." Although
members of the Commission disagreed among themselves about specific amendments,
they were united in their commitment to some minimal standards before our foundational
document was changed. Central among these was the requirement that proponents of
proposed amendments "attempt to think through and articulate the consequences of their
proposal including the ways in which the amendment would interact with other
constitutional provisions and principles."

I am sorry to conclude that the proponents of this amendment have not met this minimal
standard. If enacted, their handiwork is bound to produce outcomes that no one could
have wanted or intended and an unprecedented transfer of power over domestic relations
to federal judges. Although Americans disagree about gay marriage, surely they can
agree that more care should be taken before the Constitution is sullied in this fashion.
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